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Abstract
Traditional approaches to differential privacy assume a fixed privacy requirement ε for a
computation, and attempt to maximize the accuracy of the computation subject to the privacy
constraint. As differential privacy is increasingly deployed in practical settings, it may often be
that there is instead a fixed accuracy requirement for a given computation and the data analyst
would like to maximize the privacy of the computation subject to the accuracy constraint. This
raises the question of how to find and run a maximally private empirical risk minimizer subject
to a given accuracy requirement. We propose a general “noise reduction” framework that can
apply to a variety of private empirical risk minimization (ERM) algorithms, using them to
“search” the space of privacy levels to find the empirically strongest one that meets the accuracy
constraint, incurring only logarithmic overhead in the number of privacy levels searched. The
privacy analysis of our algorithm leads naturally to a version of differential privacy where
the privacy parameters are dependent on the data, which we term ex-post privacy, and which
is related to the recently introduced notion of privacy odometers. We also give an ex-post
privacy analysis of the classical AboveThreshold privacy tool, modifying it to allow for queries
chosen depending on the database. Finally, we apply our approach to two common objectives,
regularized linear and logistic regression, and empirically compare our noise reduction methods
to (i) inverting the theoretical utility guarantees of standard private ERM algorithms and (ii) a
stronger, empirical baseline based on binary search.
1 Introduction and Related Work
Differential Privacy [6, 7] enjoys over a decade of study as a theoretical construct, and a much more
recent set of large-scale practical deployments, including by Google [9] and Apple [10]. As the
large theoretical literature is put into practice, we start to see disconnects between assumptions
implicit in the theory and the practical necessities of applications. In this paper we focus our
attention on one such assumption in the domain of private empirical risk minimization (ERM): that
the data analyst first chooses a privacy requirement, and then attempts to obtain the best accuracy
guarantee (or empirical performance) that she can, given the chosen privacy constraint. Existing
theory is tailored to this view: the data analyst can pick her privacy parameter ε via some exogenous
process, and either plug it into a “utility theorem” to upper bound her accuracy loss, or simply
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deploy her algorithm and (privately) evaluate its performance. There is a rich and substantial
literature on private convex ERM that takes this approach, weaving tight connections between
standard mechanisms in differential privacy and standard tools for empirical risk minimization.
These methods for private ERM include output and objective perturbation [3, 4, 13, 17], covariance
perturbation [18], the exponential mechanism [2, 15], and stochastic gradient descent [2, 5, 11, 19,
20].
While these existing algorithms take a privacy-first perspective, in practice, product require-
ments may impose hard accuracy constraints, and privacy (while desirable) may not be the over-
riding concern. In such situations, things are reversed: the data analyst first fixes an accuracy
requirement, and then would like to find the smallest privacy parameter consistent with the
accuracy constraint. Here, we find a gap between theory and practice. The only theoretically sound
method available is to take a “utility theorem” for an existing private ERM algorithm and solve
for the smallest value of ε (the differential privacy parameter)—and other parameter values that
need to be set—consistent with her accuracy requirement, and then run the private ERM algorithm
with the resulting ε. But because utility theorems tend to be worst-case bounds, this approach will
generally be extremely conservative, leading to a much larger value of ε (and hence a much larger
leakage of information) than is necessary for the problem at hand. Alternately, the analyst could
attempt an empirical search for the smallest value of ε consistent with her accuracy goals. However,
because this search is itself a data-dependent computation, it incurs the overhead of additional
privacy loss. Furthermore, it is not a priori clear how to undertake such a search with nontrivial
privacy guarantees for two reasons: first, the worst case could involve a very long search which
reveals a large amount of information, and second, the selected privacy parameter is now itself a
data-dependent quantity, and so it is not sensible to claim a “standard” guarantee of differential
privacy for any finite value of ε ex-ante.
In this paper, we describe, analyze, and empirically evaluate a principled variant of this second
approach, which attempts to empirically find the smallest value of ε consistent with an accuracy
requirement. We give a meta-method that can be applied to several interesting classes of private
learning algorithms and introduces very little privacy overhead as a result of the privacy-parameter
search. Conceptually, our meta-method initially computes a very private hypothesis, and then
gradually subtracts noise (making the computation less and less private) until a sufficient level
of accuracy is achieved. One key technique that saves significant factors in privacy loss over
naive search is the use of correlated noise generated by the method of [14], which formalizes the
conceptual idea of “subtracting” noise without incurring additional privacy overhead. In order
to select the most private of these queries that meets the accuracy requirement, we introduce a
natural modification of the now-classic AboveThreshold algorithm [7], which iteratively checks
a sequence of queries on a dataset and privately releases the index of the first to approximately
exceed some fixed threshold. Its privacy cost increases only logarithmically with the number of
queries. We provide an analysis of AboveThreshold that holds even if the queries themselves are
the result of differentially private computations, showing that if AboveThreshold terminates after
t queries, one only pays the privacy costs of AboveThreshold plus the privacy cost of revealing
those first t private queries. When combined with the above-mentioned correlated noise technique
of [14], this gives an algorithm whose privacy loss is equal to that of the final hypothesis output –
the previous ones coming “for free” – plus the privacy loss of AboveThreshold. Because the privacy
guarantees achieved by this approach are not fixed a priori, but rather are a function of the data,
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we introduce and apply a new, corresponding privacy notion, which we term ex-post privacy, and
which is closely related to the recently introduced notion of “privacy odometers” [16].
In Section 4, we empirically evaluate our noise reduction meta-method, which applies to any
ERM technique which can be described as a post-processing of the Laplace mechanism. This
includes both direct applications of the Laplace mechanism, like output perturbation [4]; and more
sophisticated methods like covariance perturbation [18], which perturbs the covariance matrix of the
data and then performs an optimization using the noisy data. Our experiments concentrate on `2
regularized least-squares regression and `2 regularized logistic regression, and we apply our noise
reduction meta-method to both output perturbation and covariance perturbation. Our empirical
results show that the active, ex-post privacy approach massively outperforms inverting the theory
curve, and also improves on a baseline “ε-doubling” approach.
2 Privacy Background and Tools
2.1 Differential Privacy and Ex-Post Privacy
Let X denote the data domain. We call two datasets D,D ′ ∈ X ∗ neighbors (written as D ∼ D ′) if D
can be derived from D ′ by replacing a single data point with some other element of X .
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [6]). Fix ε ≥ 0. A randomized algorithm A : X ∗ → O is ε-
differentially private if for every pair of neighboring data sets D ∼ D ′ ∈ X ∗, and for every event
S ⊆ O:
Pr[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε)Pr[A(D ′) ∈ S].
We call exp(ε) the privacy risk factor.
It is possible to design computations that do not satisfy the differential privacy definition,
but whose outputs are private to an extent that can be quantified after the computation halts.
For example, consider an experiment that repeatedly runs an ε′-differentially private algorithm,
until a stopping condition defined by the output of the algorithm itself is met. This experiment
does not satisfy ε-differential privacy for any fixed value of ε, since there is no fixed maximum
number of rounds for which the experiment will run (for a fixed number of rounds, a simple
composition theorem, Theorem 2.5, shows that the ε-guarantees in a sequence of computations
“add up.”) However, if ex-post we see that the experiment has stopped after k rounds, the data
can in some sense be assured an “ex-post privacy loss” of only kε′. Rogers et al. [16] initiated the
study of privacy odometers, which formalize this idea. Their goal was to develop a theory of privacy
composition when the data analyst can choose the privacy parameters of subsequent computations
as a function of the outcomes of previous computations.
We apply a related idea here, for a different purpose. Our goal is to design one-shot algorithms
that always achieve a target accuracy but that may have variable privacy levels depending on their
input.
Definition 2.2. Given a randomized algorithm A : X ∗→O, define the ex-post privacy loss1 of A on
outcome o to be
Loss(o) = max
D,D ′ :D∼D ′ log
Pr[A(D) = o]
Pr[A(D ′) = o] .
1If A’s output is from a continuous distribution rather than discrete, we abuse notation and write Pr[A(D) = o] to
mean the probability density at output o.
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We refer to exp(Loss(o)) as the ex-post privacy risk factor.
Definition 2.3 (Ex-Post Differential Privacy). Let E : O→ (R≥0∪{∞}) be a function on the outcome
space of algorithm A : X ∗→O. Given an outcome o = A(D), we say that A satisfies E(o)-ex-post
differential privacy if for all o ∈ O, Loss(o) ≤ E(o).
Note that if E(o) ≤ ε for all o, A is ε-differentially private. Ex-post differential privacy has the
same semantics as differential privacy, once the output of the mechanism is known: it bounds
the log-likelihood ratio of the dataset being D vs. D ′, which controls how an adversary with an
arbitrary prior on the two cases can update her posterior.
2.2 Differential Privacy Tools
Differentially private computations enjoy two nice properties:
Theorem 2.4 (Post Processing [6]). Let A : X ∗→O be any ε-differentially private algorithm, and let
f : O→O′ be any function. Then the algorithm f ◦A : X ∗→O′ is also ε-differentially private.
Post-processing implies that, for example, every decision process based on the output of a
differentially private algorithm is also differentially private.
Theorem 2.5 (Composition [6]). Let A1 : X ∗ → O, A2 : X ∗ → O′ be algorithms that are ε1- and ε2-
differentially private, respectively. Then the algorithm A : X ∗→O×O′ defined as A(x) = (A1(x),A2(x))
is (ε1 + ε2)-differentially private.
The composition theorem holds even if the composition is adaptive—-see [8] for details.
The Laplace mechanism. The most basic subroutine we will use is the Laplace mechanism.
The Laplace Distribution centered at 0 with scale b is the distribution with probability density
function Lap(z|b) = 12be−
|z|
b . We say X ∼ Lap(b) when X has Laplace distribution with scale b.
Let f : X ∗ → Rd be an arbitrary d-dimensional function. The `1 sensitivity of f is defined to be
∆1(f ) = maxD∼D ′ ‖f (D)−f (D ′)‖1. The Laplace mechanism with parameter ε simply adds noise drawn
independently from Lap
(
∆1(f )
ε
)
to each coordinate of f (x).
Theorem 2.6 ([6]). The Laplace mechanism is ε-differentially private.
Gradual private release. Koufogiannis et al. [14] study how to gradually release private data
using the Laplace mechanism with an increasing sequence of ε values, with a privacy cost scaling
only with the privacy of the marginal distribution on the least private release, rather than the
sum of the privacy costs of independent releases. For intuition, the algorithm can be pictured as
a continuous random walk starting at some private data v with the property that the marginal
distribution at each point in time is Laplace centered at v, with variance increasing over time.
Releasing the value of the random walk at a fixed point in time gives a certain output distribution,
for example, vˆ, with a certain privacy guarantee ε. To produce vˆ′ whose ex-ante distribution has
higher variance (is more private), one can simply “fast forward” the random walk from a starting
point of vˆ to reach vˆ′; to produce a less private vˆ′, one can “rewind.” The total privacy cost is
max{ε,ε′} because, given the “least private” point (say vˆ), all “more private” points can be derived
as post-processings given by taking a random walk of a certain length starting at vˆ. Note that were
the Laplace random variables used for each release independent, the composition theorem would
require summing the ε values of all releases.
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In our private algorithms, we will use their noise reduction mechanism as a building block to
generate a list of private hypotheses θ1, . . . ,θT with gradually increasing ε values. Importantly,
releasing any prefix (θ1, . . . ,θt) only incurs the privacy loss in θt. More formally:
Algorithm 1 Noise Reduction [14]: NR(v,∆, {εt})
Input: private vector v, sensitivity parameter ∆, list ε1 < ε2 < · · · < εT
Set vˆT := v + Lap(∆/εT ) . drawn i.i.d. for each coordinate
for t = T − 1,T − 2, . . . ,1 do
With probability
(
εt
εt+1
)2
: set vˆt := vˆt+1
Else: set vˆt := vˆt+1 + Lap(∆/εt) . drawn i.i.d. for each coordinate
Return vˆ1, . . . , vˆT
Theorem 2.7 ([14]). Let f have `1 sensitivity ∆ and let vˆ1, . . . , vˆT be the output of Algorithm 1 on
v = f (D), ∆, and the increasing list ε1, . . . , εT . Then for any t, the algorithm which outputs the prefix
(vˆ1, . . . , vˆt) is εt-differentially private.
2.3 AboveThreshold with Private Queries
Our high-level approach to our eventual ERM problem will be as follows: Generate a sequence
of hypotheses θ1, . . . ,θT , each with increasing accuracy and decreasing privacy; then test their
accuracy levels sequentially, outputting the first one whose accuracy is “good enough.” The classical
AboveThreshold algorithm [7] takes in a dataset and a sequence of queries and privately outputs
the index of the first query to exceed a given threshold (with some error due to noise). We would
like to use AboveThreshold to perform these accuracy checks, but there is an important obstacle: for
us, the “queries” themselves depend on the private data.2 A standard composition analysis would
involve first privately publishing all the queries, then running AboveThreshold on these queries
(which are now public). Intuitively, though, it would be much better to generate and publish
the queries one at a time, until AboveThreshold halts, at which point one would not publish any
more queries. The problem with analyzing this approach is that, a-priori, we do not know when
AboveThreshold will terminate; to address this, we analyze the ex-post privacy guarantee of the
algorithm.3
Let us say that an algorithm M(D) = (f1, . . . , fT ) is (ε1, . . . , εT )-prefix-private if for each t, the
function that runs M(D) and outputs just the prefix (f1, . . . , ft) is εt-differentially private.
Lemma 2.8. Let M : X ∗→ (X ∗→O)T be a (ε1, . . . , εT )-prefix private algorithm that returns T queries,
and let each query output by M have `1 sensitivity at most ∆. Then Algorithm 2 run on D, εA, W , ∆,
and M is E-ex-post differentially private for E((t, ·)) = εA + εt for any t ∈ [T ].
The proof, which is a variant on the proof of privacy for AboveThreshold [7], appears in the
appendix, along with an accuracy theorem for IAT.
2In fact, there are many applications beyond our own in which the sequence of queries input to AboveThreshold
might be the result of some private prior computation on the data, and where we would like to release both the stopping
index of AboveThreshold and the “query object.” (In our case, the query objects will be parameterized by learned
hypotheses θ1, . . . ,θT .)
3This result does not follow from a straightforward application of privacy odometers from [16], because the privacy
analysis of algorithms like the noise reduction technique is not compositional.
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Algorithm 2 InteractiveAboveThreshold: IAT(D,ε,W ,∆,M)
Input: Dataset D, privacy loss ε, threshold W , `1 sensitivity ∆, algorithm M
Let Wˆ =W + Lap
(
2∆
ε
)
for each query t = 1, . . . ,T do
Query ft←M(D)t
if ft(D) + Lap
(
4∆
ε
)
≥ Wˆ : then Output (t, ft); Halt.
Output (T , ⊥).
Remark 2.9. Throughout we study ε-differential privacy, instead of the weaker (ε,δ) (approximate)
differential privacy. Part of the reason is that an analogue of Lemma 2.8 does not seem to hold for
(ε,δ)-differentially private queries without further assumptions, as the necessity to union-bound over the
δ “failure probability” that the privacy loss is bounded for each query can erase the ex-post gains. We
leave obtaining similar results for approximate differential privacy as an open problem.
3 Noise-Reduction with Private ERM
In this section, we provide a general private ERM framework that allows us to approach the best
privacy guarantee achievable on the data given a target excess risk goal. Throughout the section,
we consider an input dataset D that consists of n row vectors X1,X2, . . . ,Xn ∈ Rp and a column
y ∈ Rn. We will assume that each ‖Xi‖1 ≤ 1 and |yi | ≤ 1. Let di = (Xi , yi) ∈ Rp+1 be the i-th data
record. Let ` be a loss function such that for any hypothesis θ and any data point (Xi , yi) the loss is
`(θ, (Xi , yi)). Given an input dataset D and a regularization parameter λ, the goal is to minimize
the following regularized empirical loss function over some feasible set C:
L(θ,D) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(θ, (Xi , yi)) +
λ
2
‖θ‖22.
Let θ∗ = argminθ∈C `(θ,D). Given a target accuracy parameter α, we wish to privately compute a
θp that satisfies L(θp,D) ≤ L(θ∗,D) +α, while achieving the best ex-post privacy guarantee. For
simplicity, we will sometimes write L(θ) for L(θ,D).
One simple baseline approach is a “doubling method”: Start with a small ε value, run an
ε-differentially private algorithm to compute a hypothesis θ and use the Laplace mechanism to
estimate the excess risk of θ; if the excess risk is lower than the target, output θ; otherwise double
the value of ε and repeat the same process. (See the appendix for details.) As a result, we pay for
privacy loss for every hypothesis we compute and every excess risk we estimate.
In comparison, our meta-method provides a more cost-effective way to select the privacy level.
The algorithm takes a more refined set of privacy levels ε1 < . . . < εT as input and generates a
sequence of hypotheses θ1, . . . ,θT such that the generation of each θt is εt-private. Then it releases
the hypotheses θt in order, halting as soon as a released hypothesis meets the accuracy goal.
Importantly, there are two key components that reduce the privacy loss in our method:
1. We use Algorithm 1, the “noise reduction” method of [14], for generating the sequence of
hypotheses: we first compute a very private and noisy θ1, and then obtain the subsequent
hypotheses by gradually “de-noising” θ1. As a result, any prefix (θ1, . . . ,θk) incurs a privacy
loss of only εk (as opposed to (ε1 + . . .+ εk) if the hypotheses were independent).
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2. When evaluating the excess risk of each hypothesis, we use Algorithm 2, InteractiveAboveThresh-
old, to determine if its excess risk exceeds the target threshold. This incurs substantially
less privacy loss than independently evaluating the excess risk of each hypothesis using the
Laplace mechanism (and hence allows us to search a finer grid of values).
For the rest of this section, we will instantiate our method concretely for two ERM problems:
ridge regression and logistic regression. In particular, our noise-reduction method is based on two
private ERM algorithms: the recently introduced covariance perturbation technique of [18], and
output perturbation [4].
3.1 Covariance Perturbation for Ridge Regression
In ridge regression, we consider the squared loss function: `((Xi , yi),θ) =
1
2 (yi − 〈θ,Xi〉)2, and hence
empirical loss over the data set is defined as
L(θ,D) =
1
2n
‖y −Xθ‖22 +
λ‖θ‖22
2
,
where X denotes the (n×p) matrix with row vectors X1, . . . ,Xn and y = (y1, . . . , yn). Since the optimal
solution for the unconstrained problem has `2 norm no more than
√
1/λ (see the appendix for a
proof), we will focus on optimizing θ over the constrained set C = {a ∈ Rp | ‖a‖2 ≤
√
1/λ}, which
will be useful for bounding the `1 sensitivity of the empirical loss.
Before we formally introduce the covariance perturbation algorithm due to [18], observe that
the optimal solution θ∗ can be computed as
θ∗ = argmin
θ∈C
L(θ,D) = argmin
θ∈C
(θᵀ(XᵀX)θ − 2〈Xᵀy,θ〉)
2n
+
λ‖θ‖22
2
.
In other words, θ∗ only depends on the private data through Xᵀy and XᵀX. To compute a private
hypothesis, the covariance perturbation method simply adds Laplace noise to each entry of Xᵀy
and XᵀX (the covariance matrix), and solves the optimization based on the noisy matrix and vector.
The formal description of the algorithm and its guarantee are in Theorem 3.1. Our analysis differs
from the one in [18] in that their paper considers the “local privacy” setting, and also adds Gaussian
noise whereas we use Laplace. The proof is deferred to the appendix.
Theorem 3.1. Fix any ε > 0. For any input data set D, consider the mechanismM that computes
θp = argmin
θ∈C
1
2n
(θᵀ(XᵀX +B)θ − 2〈Xᵀy + b,θ〉) + λ‖θ‖
2
2
2
,
where B ∈Rp×p and b ∈Rp×1 are random Laplace matrices such that each entry of B and b is drawn from
Lap (4/ε). ThenM satisfies ε-differential privacy and the output θp satisfies
E
B,b
[
L(θp)−L(θ∗)
]
≤ 4
√
2(2
√
p/λ+ p/λ)
nε
.
In our algorithm CovNR, we will apply the noise reduction method, Algorithm 1, to produce a
sequence of noisy versions of the private data (XᵀX,Xᵀy): (Z1, z1), . . . , (ZT , zT ), one for each privacy
level. Then for each (Zt , zt), we will compute the private hypothesis by solving the noisy version
of the optimization problem in Equation (1). The full description of our algorithm CovNR is
in Algorithm 3, and satisfies the following guarantee:
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Algorithm 3 Covariance Perturbation with Noise-Reduction: CovNR(D, {ε1, . . . , εT },α,γ)
Input: private data set D = (X,y), accuracy parameter α, privacy levels ε1 < ε2 < . . . < εT , and
failure probability γ
Instantiate InteractiveAboveThreshold: A = IAT(D,ε0,−α/2,∆, ·) with ε0 = 16∆(log(2T /γ))/α
and ∆ = (
√
1/λ+ 1)2/(n)
Let C = {a ∈Rp | ‖a‖2 ≤
√
1/λ} and θ∗ = argminθ∈C L(θ)
Compute noisy data:
{Zt} = NR((XᵀX),2, {ε1/2, . . . , εT /2}), {zt} = NR((XᵀY ),2, {ε1/2, . . . , εT /2})
for t = 1, . . . ,T : do
θt = argmin
θ∈C
1
2n
(
θᵀZtθ − 2〈zt ,θ〉
)
+
λ‖θ‖22
2
(1)
Let f t(D) = L(θ∗,D)−L(θt ,D); Query A with query f t to check accuracy
if A returns (t, f t) then Output (t,θt) . Accurate hypothesis found.
Output: (⊥,θ∗)
Theorem 3.2. The instantiation of CovNR(D, {ε1, . . . , εT },α,γ) outputs a hypothesis θp that with prob-
ability 1−γ satisfies L(θp)−L(θ∗) ≤ α. Moreover, it is E-ex-post differentially private, where the privacy
loss function E : (([T ]∪{⊥})×Rp)→ (R≥0∪{∞}) is defined as E((k, ·)) = ε0+εk for any k ,⊥, E((⊥, ·)) =∞,
and ε0 =
16(
√
1/λ+1)2 log(2T /γ)
nα is the privacy loss incurred by IAT.
3.2 Output Perturbation for Logistic Regression
Next, we show how to combine the output perturbation method with noise reduction for the ridge re-
gression problem.4 In this setting, the input data consists of n labeled examples (X1, y1), . . . , (Xn, yn),
such that for each i, Xi ∈Rp, ‖Xi‖1 ≤ 1, and yi ∈ {−1,1}. The goal is to train a linear classifier given
by a weight vector θ for the examples from the two classes. We consider the logistic loss function:
`(θ, (Xi , yi)) = log(1 + exp(−yiθᵀXi)), and the empirical loss is
L(θ,D) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−yiθᵀXi)) +
λ‖θ‖22
2
.
The output perturbation method is straightforward: we simply add Laplace noise to perturb
each coordinate of the optimal solution θ∗. The following is the formal guarantee of output
perturbation. Our analysis deviates slightly from the one in [4] since we are adding Laplace noise
(see the appendix).
Theorem 3.3. Fix any ε > 0. Let r = 2
√
p
nλε . For any input dataset D, consider the mechanism that
first computes θ∗ = argminθ∈Rp L(θ), then outputs θp = θ∗ + b, where b is a random vector with
4We study the ridge regression problem for concreteness. Our method works for any ERM problem with strongly
convex loss functions.
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its entries drawn i.i.d. from Lap (r). Then M satisfies ε-differential privacy, and θp has excess risk
Eb
[
L(θp)−L(θ∗)
]
≤ 2
√
2p
nλε +
4p2
n2λε2 .
Given the output perturbation method, we can simply apply the noise reduction method
NR to the optimal hypothesis θ∗ to generate a sequence of noisy hypotheses. We will again
use InteractiveAboveThreshold to check the excess risk of the hypotheses. The full algorithm
OutputNR follows the same structure in Algorithm 3, and we defer the formal description to the
appendix.
Theorem 3.4. The instantiation of OutputNR(D,ε0, {ε1, . . . , εT },α,γ) is E-ex-post differentially private
and outputs a hypothesis θp that with probability 1−γ satisfies L(θp)−L(θ∗) ≤ α, where the privacy loss
function E : (([T ]∪ {⊥})×Rp)→ (R≥0 ∪ {∞}) is defined as E((k, ·)) = ε0 + εk for any k ,⊥, E((⊥, ·)) =∞,
and ε0 ≤ 32log(2T /γ)
√
2log2/λ
nα is the privacy loss incurred by IAT.
Proof sketch of Theorems 3.2 and 3.4. The accuracy guarantees for both algorithms follow from an
accuracy guarantee of the IAT algorithm (a variant on the standard AboveThreshold bound) and
the fact that we output θ∗ if IAT identifies no accurate hypothesis. For the privacy guarantee, first
note that any prefix of the noisy hypotheses θ1, . . . ,θt satisfies εt-differential privacy because of
our instantiation of the Laplace mechanism (see the appendix for the `1 sensitivity analysis) and
noise-reduction method NR. Then the ex-post privacy guarantee directly follows Lemma 2.8.
4 Experiments
To evaluate the methods described above, we conducted empirical evaluations in two settings. We
used ridge regression to predict (log) popularity of posts on Twitter in the dataset of [1], with p = 77
features and subsampled to n =100,000 data points. Logistic regression was applied to classifying
network events as innocent or malicious in the KDD-99 Cup dataset [12], with 38 features and
subsampled to 100,000 points. Details of parameters and methods appear in the appendix.
In each case, we tested the algorithm’s average ex-post privacy loss for a range of input accuracy
goals α, fixing a modest failure probability γ = 0.1 (and we observed that excess risks were
concentrated well below α/2, suggesting a pessimistic analysis). The results show our meta-method
gives a large improvement over the “theory” approach of simply inverting utility theorems for
private ERM algorithms. (In fact, the utility theorem for the popular private stochastic gradient
descent algorithm does not even give meaningful guarantees for the ranges of parameters tested;
one would need an order of magnitude more data points, and even then the privacy losses are
enormous, perhaps due to loose constants in the analysis.)
To gauge the more modest improvement over DoublingMethod, note that the variation in the
privacy risk factor eε can still be very large; for instance, in the ridge regression setting of α = 0.05,
Noise Reduction has eε ≈ 10.0 while DoublingMethod has eε ≈ 495; at α = 0.075, the privacy risk
factors are 4.65 and 56.6 respectively.
Interestingly, for our meta-method, the contribution to privacy loss from “testing” hypotheses
(the InteractiveAboveThreshold technique) was significantly larger than that from “generating”
them (NoiseReduction). One place where the InteractiveAboveThreshold analysis is loose is in
using a theoretical bound on the maximum norm of any hypothesis to compute the sensitivity of
queries. The actual norms of hypotheses tested was significantly lower which, if taken as guidance
9
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Figure 1: Ex-post privacy loss. (1a) and (1c), left, represent ridge regression on the Twitter dataset,
where Noise Reduction and DoublingMethod both use Covariance Perturbation. (1b) and (1d),
right, represent logistic regression on the KDD-99 Cup dataset, where both Noise Reduction and
DoublingMethod use Output Perturbation. The top plots compare Noise Reduction to the “theory
approach”: running the algorithm once using the value of ε that guarantees the desired expected
error via a utility theorem. The bottom compares to the DoublingMethod baseline. Note the
top plots are generous to the theory approach: the theory curves promise only expected error,
whereas Noise Reduction promises a high probability guarantee. Each point is an average of 80
trials (Twitter dataset) or 40 trials (KDD-99 dataset).
10
to the practitioner in advance, would drastically improve the privacy guarantee of both adaptive
methods.
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A Missing Details and Proofs
A.1 AboveThreshold
Proof of Lemma 2.8. Let D,D ′ be neighboring databases. We will instead analyze the algorithm
that outputs the entire prefix f1, . . . , ft when stopping at time t. Because IAT is a post-processing of
this algorithm, and privacy can only be improved under post-processing, this suffices to prove the
theorem. We wish to show for all outcomes o = (t, f1, . . . , ft):
Pr[IAT(D) = (t, f1, f2, . . . , ft)] ≤ eεA+εt Pr[IAT(D ′) = (t, f1, f2, . . . , ft)] .
We have directly from the privacy guarantee of InteractiveAboveThreshold that for every fixed
sequence of queries f1, . . . , ft:
Pr[IAT(D) = t | f1, . . . , ft] ≤ eεA Pr[IAT(D ′) = t | f1, . . . , ft] (2)
because the guarantee of InteractiveAboveThreshold is quantified over all data-independent
sequences of queries f1, . . . , fT , and by definition of the algorithm, the probability of stopping at
time t is independent of the identity of any query f ′t for t′ > t.
Now we can write:
Pr[IAT(D) = t, f1, . . . ft] = Pr[IAT(D) = t | f1, . . . ft]Pr[M(D) = f1, . . . ft] .
By assumption, M is prefix-private, in particular, for fixed t and any f1, . . . , ft:
Pr[M(D) = f1, . . . ft] ≤ eεt Pr[M(D ′) = f1, . . . ft]
Thus,
Pr[IAT(D) = t, f1, . . . ft]
Pr[IAT(D ′) = t, f1, . . . ft]
=
Pr[IAT(D) = t | f1, . . . ft]
Pr[IAT(D ′) = t|f1, . . . , ft]
Pr[M(D) = f1, . . . ft]
Pr[M(D ′) = f1, . . . ft]
≤ eεA · eεt = eεA+εt ,
as desired.
We also include the following utility theorem. We say that an instantiation of Interactive-
AboveThreshold is (α,β) accurate with respect to a threshold W and stream of queries f1, . . . fT if
except with probability at most γ , the algorithm outputs a query ft only if ft(D) ≥W −α.
Theorem A.1. For any sequence of 1-sensitive queries f1, . . . , fT such InteractiveAboveThreshold is
(α,β)-accurate for
α =
8∆(log(T ) + log(2/γ))
ε
.
A.2 Doubling Method
We now formally describe the DoublingMethod discussed in Section 1 and Section 3, and give
a formal ex-post privacy analysis. Let θ∗ = argminθ∈Rp L(θ). DoublingMethod accepts a list of
privacy levels ε1 < ε2 < . . . < εT , where εi = 2εi−1. We show in Claim B.1 that 2 is the optimal factor
to scale ε by. It also takes in a failure probability γ , and a black-box private ERM mechanism M
that has the following guarantee: Fixing a dataset D, M takes as input D and a privacy level εi , and
generates an εi-differentially private hypothesis θi , such that the query f i(D) = L(D,θ∗)−L(D,θi)
has `1 sensitivity at most ∆.
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Algorithm 4 Doubling Method: DoublingMethod(D, {ε1, . . . , εT },M,α,γ)
Input: private dataset D, accuracy α, failure probability γ , mechanism M
for each t = 1, . . . ,T do
Generate θt←M(D)t
Let f t(D) = L(D,θ∗)−L(D,θt)
Generate wt ∼ Lap
(
α
2log( Tγ )
)
if f t(D) +wt ≥ −α/2: then Output (t, f t); Halt.
Output T + 1,θ∗.
Theorem A.2. For k ≤ T , define the privacy loss function E(k,θk) = 2k∆ log(T /γ)α + (2k − 1)ε1, andE(T +
1,θ∗) =∞. Then DoublingMethod is E-ex-post differentially private, and is 1−γ accurate.
Proof. Since if the algorithm reaches step T + 1 it outputs the true minimizer which has error 0 < α,
it could only fail to output a hypothesis with error less than α if it stops at i ≤ T . DoublingMethod
only stops early if the noisy query is greater than −α/2; or f i(D)+wi ≥ −α/2. But f i(D) ≤ −α, which
forces wi ≥ α/2. By properties of the Laplace distribution, Pr[wi ≥ α/2] = 12exp(−α2
2log( T2γ )
α ) = γ/T .
Hence by union bound over T the total failure probability is at most γ .
By the assumption, generating the kth private hypothesis incurs privacy loss ε1 ∗ 2k−1. By the
Laplace mechanism, evaluating the error of the sensitivity ∆ query f i is 2∆ log(T /γ)α -differentially
private. Theorem 3.6 in [16] then says that the ex-post privacy loss of outputting k ≤ T is ∑ki=1[ε1 ∗
2k−1 + 2∆ log(T /γ)α ] =
2k∆ log(T /γ)
α + (2
k − 1)ε1, as desired.
Remark A.3. In practice, the private empirical risk minimization mechanism M may not always output
a hypothesis that leads to queries with uniformly bounded `1 sensitivity. In this case, a projection that
scales down, the hypothesis norm can be applied prior to evaluating the private query error. For a
discussion of scaling the norm down refer to the experiments section of the appendix.
A.3 Ridge Regression
In this subsection, we let `(θ, (Xi , yi)) =
1
2 (yi − 〈θ,Xi〉)2, and the empirical loss over the data set is
defined as
L(D,θ) =
1
2n
‖y −Xθ‖22 +
λ‖θ‖22
2
,
where X denotes the (n× p) matrix with row vectors X1, . . . ,Xn and y = (y1, . . . , yn). We assume that
for each i, ‖Xi‖1 ≤ 1 and |yi | ≤ 1. For simplicity, we will sometimes write L(θ) for L(D,θ).
First, we show that the unconstrained optimal solution in ridge regression has bounded norm.
Lemma A.4. Let θ∗ = argminθ∈Rd L(θ). Then ||θ∗||2 ≤ 1√λ .
Proof. For any θ ∈Rp,L(θ∗) ≤ L(θ). In particular for θ = 0,
L(θ∗) ≤ L(0) =
n∑
i=1
1
2n
`((Xi , yi),0) ≤ 12 .
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Note that for any θ,`((Xi , yi),θ) ≥ 0, so this means L(θ∗) ≥ λ2 ||θ∗||22, which forces λ2 ||θ∗||22 ≤ 12 , and so
||θ∗||2 ≤ 1√λ as desired.
The following claim provides a bound on the sensitivity for the excess risk, which are the
queries we send to InteractiveAboveThreshold.
Claim A.5. Let C be a bounded convex set in Rp with ‖C‖2 ≤M. Let D and D ′ be a pair of adjacent
datasets, and let θ∗ = argminθ∈C L(θ,D) and θ• = argminθ∈C L(θ,D ′). Then for any θ ∈ C,
|(L(θ,D)−L(θ∗,D))− (L(θ,D ′)−L(θ•,D ′))| ≤ (M + 1)
2
n
.
The following lemma provides a bound on the `1 sensitivity for the matrix XᵀX and vector
Xᵀy.
Lemma A.6. Fix any i ∈ [n]. Let X and Z be two n×p matrices such that for all rows j , i, Xj = Zj . Let
y,y′ ∈Rn such that yj = y′j for all j , i. Then
‖XᵀX −ZᵀZ‖1 ≤ 2 and ‖Xᵀy −Zᵀy′‖1 ≤ 2,
as long as ‖Xi‖,‖Zi‖, |yi |, |y′i | ≤ 1.
Proof. We can write
‖XᵀX −ZᵀZ‖1 = ‖
∑
j
(
X
ᵀ
j Xj −Zᵀj Zj
)
‖1
= ‖Xᵀi Xi −Zᵀi Z‖1
≤ ‖Xᵀi Xi‖1 + ‖Zᵀi Zi‖1
= ‖Xi‖21 + ‖Zi‖21 ≤ 2.
Similarly,
‖Xᵀy −Zᵀy′‖1 = ‖
∑
j
(
yjXj − y′jZj
)
‖1
= ‖yiXi − y′iZi‖1
= ‖yiXi‖1 + ‖y′iZi‖1
= ‖Xi‖1 + ‖Zi‖1 ≤ 2.
This completes the proof.
Before we proceed to give a formal proof for Theorem 3.1, we will also give the following basic
fact about Laplace random vectors.
Claim A.7. Let ν = (ν1, . . . ,νk) ∈Rk such that each νi is an independent random variable drawn from
the Laplace distribution Lap (r). Then E [‖ν‖2] ≤
√
2kr.
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Proof. By Jensen’s inequality,
E [‖ν‖2] = E

√∑
i
ν2i
 ≤
√
E
∑
i
ν2i
.
Note that by linearity of expectation and the variance of the Laplace distribution
E
∑
i
ν2i
 = ∑
i
E
[
ν2i
]
=
∑
i
2r2 = 2kr2.
Therefore, we have E [‖ν‖2] ≤
√
2kr.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. In the algorithm, we compute Z = XᵀX +B and z = Xᵀy +b, where the entries
of B and b are drawn i.i.d. from Lap(4/ε). Note that the output θp is simply a post-processing of the
noisy matrix Z and vector z. Furthermore, by Lemma A.6, the joint vector (Z,z) is has sensitivity
bounded by 4 with respect to `1 norm. Therefore, the mechanism satisfies ε-differential privacy by
the privacy guarantee of the Laplace mechanism.
Let M =
√
1/λ and Lp(θ) =
1
2n (−2〈z,θ〉) + 12n (θᵀZθ) + λ‖θ‖
2
2
2 . Observe that θp = argminθ∈C Lp(θ).
Our goal is to bound L(θp)−L(θ∗), which can be written as follows
L(θp)−L(θ∗) = L(θp)−Lp(θp) +Lp(θp)−Lp(θ∗) +Lp(θ∗)−L(θ∗)
≤ L(θp)−Lp(θp) +Lp(θ∗)−L(θ∗)
=
1
2n
(
2〈b,θp〉 −θᵀpBθp
)
− 1
2n
(2〈b,θ∗〉 − (θ∗)ᵀBθ∗)
Moreover, 〈b,θp〉 ≤ ‖b‖2‖θp‖2 ≤M‖b‖2 and
−θᵀpBθp = −
∑
(s,t)∈[p]2
Bst(θp)s(θp)t
≤
∑
(s,t)
B2st

1/2 ∑
s,t
(θp)
2
s (θp)
2
t
1/2
= ‖B‖F

∑
s
(θp)
2
s
2

1/2
≤ ‖B‖FM2
By Claim A.7, we also have E [‖B‖F] ≤ 4
√
2p/ε and E [‖b‖2] ≤ 4√2p/ε. Finally,
E
[
L(θp)−L(θ∗)
]
≤ E
[ 1
2n
(
2〈b,θp〉 −θᵀpBθp
)
− 1
2n
(2〈b,θ∗〉 − (θ∗)ᵀBθ∗)
]
= E
[
2〈b,θp〉 −θᵀpBθp
2n
]
≤ E [2M‖b‖2] +E
[
M2‖B‖F
]
2n
≤ 4
√
2(2
√
pM + pM2)
nε
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which recovers our stated bound.
Next, we will also provide a theoretical result for applying output perturbation (with Laplace
noise) to the ridge regression problem. This will provides us the “theory curve” for output
perturbation in ridge regression plot of Figure 1a.
First, the following sensitivity bound on the optimal solution for L follows directly from the
strong convexity of L.
Lemma A.8. Let C be a bounded convex set in Rp with ‖C‖2 ≤M. Let D and D ′ be a pair of neighboring
datasets, and let θ∗ = argminθ∈C L(θ,D) and θ• = argminθ∈C L(θ,D ′). Then ‖θ∗ −θ•‖1 ≤ (M + 1)
√
p
nλ .
Theorem A.9. Let ε > 0 and C be a bounded convex set with ‖C‖2 ≤
√
1/λ. Let r = (
√
1/λ+1)
√
p/(nλ)/ε.
Consider the following mechanismM that for any input dataset D first computes the optimal solution
θ∗ = argminθ∈C L(θ), and then outputs θp = θ∗ + b, where b is a random vector with its entries drawn
i.i.d. from Lap (r). ThenM satisfies ε-differential privacy, and θp satisfies
E
b
[
L(θp)−L(θ∗)
]
≤=
(1
n
+λ
) (√1/λ+ 1)2p2
nλε2
.
Proof. The privacy guarantee follows directly from the use of Laplace mechanism and the `1
sensitivity bound in Lemma A.8.
For each data point di = (Xi , yi), we have
(yi − 〈θp,Xi〉)2 − (yi − 〈θ∗,Xi〉)2 = (〈θp,Xi〉)2 − (〈θ∗,Xi〉)2 − 2〈b,Xi〉
= bᵀ(Xᵀi Xi)b+ (θ
∗)ᵀ(Xᵀi Xi)b+ b
ᵀ(Xᵀi Xi)θ
∗ − 2〈b,Xi〉
Since each entry in b has mean 0, we can simplify the expectation as
E
[
(yi − 〈θp,Xi〉)2 − (yi − 〈θ∗,Xi〉)2
]
= E
[
bᵀ(Xᵀi Xi)b
]
= E
[
(〈b,Xi〉)2
]
≤ E
[
‖b‖22‖Xi‖22
]
= E
[
‖b‖22
]
E
[
‖Xi‖22
]
≤ E
[
‖b‖22
]
≤ 2pr2
In the following, let M =
√
1/λ. We can then bound
‖θp‖22 − ‖θ∗‖22 =
∑
s∈[p]
[
(θs + bs)
2 −θ2s
]
=
∑
s∈[p]
[
2θsbs + b
2
s
]
,
Again, since each bs is drawn from Lap(r), we get
E
[
‖θp‖22 − ‖θ∗‖22
]
= E
∑
s
b2s

=
∑
s
E
[
b2s
]
= 2pr2.
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To put all the pieces together and plugging in the value of r, we get
E
b
[
L(θp)−L(θ∗)
]
≤
( 1
2n
+
λ
2
)
2pr2
=
(1
n
+λ
) (M + 1)2p2
nλε2
which recovers our stated bound.
A.4 Logistic Regression
In this subsection, the input data D consists of n labelled examples (X1, y1), . . . , (Xn, yn), such that
for each i, xi ∈Rp, ‖xi‖1 ≤ 1, and yi ∈ {−1,1}.
We consider the logistic loss function: `(θ, (Xi , yi)) = log(1 + exp(−yiθᵀXi)), and our empirical
loss is defined as
L(θ,D) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−yiθᵀXi)) +
λ‖θ‖22
2
.
In output perturbation, the noise needs to scale with the `1-sensitivity of the optimal solution,
which is given by the following lemma.
Lemma A.10. Let D and D ′ be a pair of neighboring datasets. Let θ = argminw∈Rp L(w,D) and
θ′ = argminw′∈Rp L(w′ ,D ′). Then ‖θ −θ′‖1 ≤ 2
√
p
nλ .
Proof of Lemma A.10. By Corollary 8 of [4], we can bound
‖θ −θ′‖2 ≤ 2nλ
By the fact that ‖a‖1 ≤ √p‖a‖2 for any a ∈Rp, we recover the stated result.
We will show that the optimal solution for the unconstrained problem has `2 norm no more
than
√
2log2/λ.
Claim A.11. The (unconstrained) optimal solution θ∗ has norm ‖θ∗‖2 ≤
√
2log2
λ .
Proof. Note that the weight vector θ = ~0 has loss log2. Therefore, L(θ∗) ≤ log2. Since the logistic
loss is positive, we know that the regularization term
λ
2
‖θ∗‖22 ≤ log2.
It follows that ‖θ∗‖2 ≤
√
2log2
λ .
We will focus on generating hypotheses θ within the set C = {a ∈Rp | ‖a‖2 ≤
√
2log2/λ}. Then
we can bound the `1 sensitivity of the excess risk using the following result.
Claim A.12. Let D and D ′ be a pair of neighboring datasets. Then for any θ ∈Rp such that ‖θ‖2 ≤M,
|L(θ,D)−L(θ,D ′)| ≤ 2
n
log
(
1 + exp(M)
1 + exp(−M)
)
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The following fact is useful for our utility analysis for the output perturbation method.
Claim A.13. Fix any data point (x,y) such that ‖x‖1 ≤ 1 and y ∈ {−1,1}. The logistic loss function
`(θ, (x,y)) is a 1-Lipschitz function in θ.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. The privacy guarantee follows directly from the use of Laplace mechanism
and the `1-sensitivity bound in Lemma A.10. Since the logistic loss function is 1-Lipschitz. For any
(x,y) in our domain,
|`(θ∗, (x,y))− `(θp, (x,y))| ≤ ‖θ∗ −θp‖2 = ‖b‖2.
Furthermore,
‖θp‖22 − ‖θ∗‖22 = ‖θ∗ + b‖22 − ‖θ∗‖22 = 2〈b,θ∗〉+ ‖b‖22
By Claim A.7 and the property of the Laplace distribution, we know that
E [‖b‖2] ≤
√
2pr and E
[
‖b‖22
]
= 2pr2.
It follows that
E
b
[
L(θp)−L(θ∗)
]
≤ E
b
[‖b‖2] + λ2 E
[
‖b‖22
]
≤√2pr + pλr2 = 2√2pr
nλε
+
4p2
n2λε2
,
which recovers the stated bound.
We include the full details of OutputNR in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Output Perturbation with Noise-Reduction: OutputNR(D, {ε1, . . . , εT },α,γ)
Input: private data set D = (X,y), accuracy parameter α, privacy levels ε1 < ε2 < . . . < εT , and
failure probability γ
Let M =
√
2log2/λ
Instantiate Interactive AboveThreshold: A = (D,ε0,α/2,2log(1 + exp(M))/(1 + exp(−M))/(n), ·)with
ε0 = 16∆(log(2T /γ))/α and ∆ = 2log(1 + exp(M))/(1 + exp(−M))/(n)
Let C = {a ∈Rp | ‖a‖2 ≤
√
1/λ} and θ∗ = argminθ∈Rp L(θ)
Generate hypotheses: {θt} = NR(θ∗, 2
√
p
nλ , {ε1, . . . , εT })
for t = 1, . . . ,T : do
if ‖θt‖2 ≤M then Set θt =M(θt/‖θt‖2) . Rescale the norm for bounded sensitivity
Let f t(D) = L(D,θ∗)−L(D,θt)
Query A with f t
if yes then Output (t,θt)
Output: (⊥,θ∗)
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B Experiments
B.1 Parameters and data
For simplicity and to avoid over-fitting, we fixed the following parameters for both experiments:
• n =100,000 (number of data points)
• λ = 0.005 (regularization parameter)
• γ = 0.10 (requested failure probability)
• ε1 = 4E, where E is the inversion of the theory guarantee for the underlying algorithm. For
example in the logistic regression setting where the algorithm is Output Perturbation, E is
the value such that setting ε = E guarantees expected excess risk of at most α.
• εT = 1.0/n.
• α = 0.005,0.010,0.015, . . . ,0.200 (requested excess error bound).
For NoiseReduction, we choose T = 1000 (maximum number of iterations) and set εt = ε1rt for the
appropriate r, i.e. r =
(
εT
ε1
)1/T
.
For the Doubling method, T is equal to the number of doubling steps until εt exceeds εT , i.e.
T = dlog2(ε1/εT )e.
Features, labels, and transformations. The Twitter dataset has p = 77 features (dimension of
each x), relating to measurements of activity relating to a posting; the label y is a measurement of
the “buzz” or success of the posting. Because general experience suggests that such numbers likely
follow a heavy-tailed distribution, we transformed the labels by y 7→ log(1 + y) and set the taks of
predicting the transformed label.
The KDD-99 Cup dataset has p = 38 features relating to attributes of a network connection
such as duration of connection, number of bytes sent in each direction, binary attributes, etc. The
goal is to classify connections as innocent or malicious, with malicious connections broken down
into further subcategories. We transformed three attributes containing likely heavy-tailed data
(the first three mentioned above) by xi 7→ log(1 + xi), dropped three columns containing textual
categorical data, and transformed the labels into 1 for any kind of malicious connection and 0 for
an innocent one. (The feature length p = 38 is after dropping the text columns.)
For both datasets, we transformed the data by renormalizing to maximum L1-norm 1. That is,
we computed M = maxi ‖xi‖1, and transformed each xi 7→ xi/M. In the case of the Twitter dataset,
we did the same (separately) for the y labels. This is not a private operation (unlike the previous
ones) on the data, as it depends precisely on the maximum norm. We do not consider the problem
of privately ensuring bounded-norm data, as it is orthogonal to the questions we study.
The code for the experiments is implemented in python3 using the numpy and scikit-learn
libraries.
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B.2 Additional results
Figure 2 plots the empirical accuracies of the output hypotheses, to ensure that the algorithms are
achieving their theoretical guarantees. In fact, they do significantly better, which is reasonable
considering the private testing methodology: set a threshold significantly below the goal α, add
independent noise to each query, and accept only if the query plus noise is smaller than the
threshold. Combined with the requirement to use tail bounds, the accuracies tend to be significantly
smaller than α and with significantly higher probability than 1−γ . (Recall: this is not necessarily
a good thing, as it probably costs a significant amount of extra privacy.)
Figure 3 shows the breakdown in privacy losses between the “privacy test” and the “hypothesis
generator”. In the case of NoiseReduction, these are AboveThreshold’s εA and the εt of the private
method, Covariance Perturbation or Output Perturbation. In the case of Doubling, these are the
accrued ε due to tests at each step and due to Covariance Perturbation or Output Perturbation for
outputting the hypotheses.
This shows the majority of the privacy loss is due to testing for privacy levels. One reason why
might be that the cost of privacy tests depends heavily on certain constants, such as the norm of
the hypothesis being tested. This norm is upper-bounded by a theoretical maximum which is used,
but a smaller maximum would allow for significantly higher computed privacy levels for the same
algorithm. In other words, the analysis might be loose compared to an analysis that knows the
norms of the hypotheses, although this is a private quantity. Figure 4 supports the conclusion that
generally, the theoretical maximum was very pessimistic in our cases. Note that a tenfold reduction
in norm gives a tenfold reduction in privacy level for logistic regression, where sensitivity is linear
in maximum norm; and a hundred-fold reduction for ridge regression.
B.3 Supporting theory
Claim B.1. For the “doubling method”, the factor 2 increase in ε at each time step gives the optimal
worst case ex post privacy loss guarantee.
Proof. In a given setting, suppose ε∗ is the “final” level of privacy at which the algorithm would
halt. With a factor 1/r increase for r < 1, the final loss may be as large as ε∗/r. The total loss is the
sum of that loss and all previous losses, i.e. if t steps were taken:
(ε∗/r) + r · (ε∗/r) + · · ·+ rt−1 · (ε∗/r) = (ε∗/r)
t−1∑
j=0
rj
→ (ε∗/r)
∞∑
j=0
rj
=
ε∗
r(1− r)
≥ 4ε∗.
The final inequality implies that setting r = 0.5 and (1/r) = 2 is optimal. The asymptotic → is
justified by noting that the starting ε1 may be chosen arbitrarily small, so there exist parameters
that exceed the value of that summation for any finite t; and the summation limits to 11−r as
t→∞.
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(a) Linear (ridge) regression.
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(b) Regularized logistic regression.
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(c) Linear (ridge) regression.
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(d) Regularized logistic regression.
Figure 2: Empirical accuracies. The dashed line shows the requested accuracy level, while the
others plot the actual accuracy achieved. Due most likely due to a pessimistic analysis and the need
to set a small testing threshold, accuracies are significantly better than requested for both methods.
23
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Input α (excess error guarantee)
0
1
2
3
4
e
x
-p
o
st
 p
ri
v
a
cy
 l
o
ss
 ²
Breakdown of privacy loss
NoiseReduction
² due to accuracy check
² due to computing hypotheses
(a) Linear (ridge) regression.
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(b) Regularized logistic regression.
Figure 3: Privacy breakdowns. Shows the amount of empirical privacy loss due to computing the
hypotheses themselves and the losses due to testing their accuracies.
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(a) Linear (ridge) regression.
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(b) Regularized logistic regression.
Figure 4: L2 norms of final hypotheses. Shows the average L2 norm of the output θˆ for each
method, versus the theoretical maximum of 1/
√
λ in the case of ridge regression and
√
2log(2)/λ in
the case of regularized logistic regression.
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